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Abstract 
Prior expectations have a powerful influence on perception, biasing both decision 
and confidence. However, how this occurs at the neural level remains unclear. It has 
been suggested that spontaneous alpha-band neural oscillations represent rhythms 
of the perceptual system that periodically modulate perceptual judgements. We 
hypothesised that these oscillations instantiate the effects of expectations. While 
collecting scalp EEG, participants performed a detection task that orthogonally 
manipulated perceptual expectations and attention. Trial-by-trial retrospective 
confidence judgements were also collected. Results showed that independently of 
attention, pre-stimulus occipital alpha phase predicted the weighting of expectations 
on yes/no decisions. Moreover, phase predicted the influence of expectations on 
confidence. Thus, expectations periodically bias objective and subjective perceptual 
decision-making together, prior to stimulus onset. Our results suggest that alpha-
band neural oscillations periodically transmit prior evidence to visual cortex, 
changing the baseline from which evidence accumulation begins. In turn, our results 
inform accounts of how expectations shape early visual processing. 
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	Perception is subject to powerful top-down influences. For example, a highly 
ambiguous figure can be easily identified following brief priming of object identity 
(Porter, 1954). Many believe that the feed-forward sensory input is shaped by 
feedback or recurrent connections from high-level cortical areas to lower-level 
regions (Gilbert & Li, 2013; Gilbert & Sigman, 2007; Lee, 2002) following a first pass 
up the sensory hierarchy (Bar, 2003). However, the neuronal mechanisms that 
integrate top-down and bottom-up signals remain largely unknown (Bar, 2003) 
Top-down influences, including priming, context effects and prior exposure, can be 
parsimoniously construed as a process that biases perceptual inference towards a 
plausible solution. In line with this, there has been renewed interest in framing top-
down influences in terms of probabilistic prior beliefs, or 'expectations' (Summerfield 
& de Lange, 2014) which, behaviorally, bias perceptual choice (Sherman et al. 2015; 
de Lange et al. 2013). It is suggested that expectations are represented in high-level 
cortical regions prior to the perceptual event, and entrain task-relevant neurons at 
lower levels to increase sensitivity (Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001). Spontaneous 
neural oscillations are therefore a promising candidate mechanism for how 
expectations shape perception.   
Oscillations in the alpha range are particularly relevant when considering how 
expectations influence perception. Theoretical models have associated top-down 
processes with oscillations in the 8 to 14Hz range (Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, 
Bastos, Pinotsis, & Litvak, 2014) and recent neurophysiological findings suggest that 
occipital alpha oscillations primarily propagate in a top-down fashion (van Kerkoerle 
et al., 2014), supporting the notion that alpha power is intimately related to top-down 
control (Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007; Mathewson et al., 2012; Palva & 
Palva, 2007). Recent work has revealed that the phase (in addition to power) of pre-
stimulus alpha oscillations also predicts various components of perception. These 
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include spatial attention (Busch & VanRullen, 2010), saccadic reaction speed 
(Drewes & VanRullen, 2011), and perceptual awareness ratings (Mathewson, 
Gratton, Fabiani, Beck, & Ro, 2009). This has been interpreted as reflecting cycles in 
the 'preparedness' of the perceptual system (Vanrullen, Busch, Drewes, & Dubois, 
2011).  In Bayesian terms, prior beliefs (i.e. expectations) are available before 
stimulus onset. Accordingly, we hypothesized that this ‘preparedness’ should be 
modulated by expectations: anticipating a perceptual event should bias perceptual 
inference towards that event. This was tested by asking whether the extent to which 
decisions are biased by expectation oscillates with pre-stimulus occipital alpha 
phase.  
Perceptual decisions are additionally accompanied by a subjective degree of 
confidence, which represents uncertainty arising through external (i.e. sensory) or 
internal noise. Recent work has shown that the decision variable and decision 
confidence may be encoded together (Roozbeh Kiani & Shadlen, 2009), and arise 
from the same sensory evidence (Fetsch, Kiani, Newsome, & Shadlen, 2014). In 
addition to expectations biasing decision, expected perceptual events are associated 
with greater subjective confidence (Sherman et al. 2015). Following these findings, 
we additionally hypothesized that pre-stimulus alpha phase would predict the 
influence of perceptual priors on confidence  
These two hypotheses were tested by adopting a dual-task Gabor detection 
paradigm which manipulated prior expectations while controlling for the (often 
conflated) influence of attention (Feldman and Friston 2010; Summerfield and Egner 
2009). Prior expectations of target presence or absence were induced by 
manipulating (block-wise) the probability of Gabor appearance, presented at a 
contrast that yielded 78% accuracy. The probability was either 25%, where absence 
was expected, or 75%, where presence was expected. A concurrent visual search 
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task diverted attention from the Gabor task in half of the blocks. Critically, the visual 
search array and Gabor were presented simultaneously following a jittered inter-
stimulus interval (ISI; figure 1). This allowed us to time-lock our EEG analysis to both 
Gabor present and Gabor absent trials, and compute independent measures of 
decision threshold (bias) and detection sensitivity as a function of condition and pre-
stimulus EEG phase.  
Our first hypothesis was that pre-stimulus alpha phase would predict the extent to 
which decision threshold is biased by expectation. This would be shown if (1) 
decision threshold oscillates with pre-stimulus phase and (2) there is some phase 
angle that predicts ‘yes’ responses when expecting target presence (the 75% 
condition) while predicting ‘no’ responses when expecting target absence (the 25% 
condition). 
Our second hypothesis was that pre-stimulus alpha phase would also predict 
expectancy effects on subjective confidence. This would be shown if (1) confidence 
oscillates with pre-stimulus phase and (2) the same phase that predicts high 
confidence when expectations are met will predict low confidence when expectations 
are violated. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 20 English-speaking subjects (13 female) aged between 20 and 32 
years (M = 25.6 SD = 3.3) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. One 
participant’s data were excluded from analysis for being excessively noisy, and a 
second for having too few trials (<500 vs. mean of ~1,100). This was due to 
excessively slow responding. This left 18 participants’ data for analysis. All 
participants gave informed, written consent and were reimbursed at £10.30/hour. On 
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average, each session lasted 2.5 hours and two sessions were completed 24 hours 
apart. Ethical approval was awarded by the University of Sussex ethics committee 
(C-REC). 
Stimuli and Design 
The experiment was presented on a 21-inch CRT monitor (100Hz, 1048 x 700 
resolution) using Psychtoolbox for Matlab. The experiment was composed of two 
concurrent tasks: detection of a peripheral Gabor patch and a visual search task in 
the center of the screen (figure 1).  
Trials began with the onset of a white fixation cross. After a jittered inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI; 1000 to 1500ms) the visual search array appeared. This consisted of 
four rotated (random orientation of 0 ̊ -359 ̊), white, capitalized letters arranged around 
fixation (1.43° x 1.43°) at 0°, 90°, 180° and 270°. On 50% of trials the visual search 
target was absent and all letters were 'L's. On the other 50%, one randomly 
designated 'L' was replaced by a target 'T'. To ensure that the task was sufficiently 
difficult to divert attention from the Gabor task, this array was backwards masked by 
an array of 'F's. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the visual search 
and masking array was titrated for each individual to equated detection performance 
to 78% across participants (see Staircases).  
On Gabor 'target present' trials a peripheral (3.85 ̊ x 4.095 ̊ visual angle) Gabor patch 
(SD, sf 0.08c/d, phase 45 ̊) was presented in the lower-right quadrant of the screen. 
On these trials the Gabor and the visual search array appeared simultaneously. The 
Gabor was presented for 10ms at the contrast resulting in a 78% hit rate (see 
Staircases). 
Following the offset of the visual search array a series of response prompts 
appeared. Using a key-press, participants made un-speeded judgments of first, 
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Gabor presence or absence, second, confidence that they were correct on an 
interval scale from 1(no confidence) to 4 (total confidence), and finally, the presence 
or absence of a ‘T’ in the visual search array. 
The experiment had four conditions, constructed in a blocked attention (full, diverted) 
by expectation (expect Gabor presence, expect Gabor absence) design. Under full 
attention participants fixated centrally but did not perform the visual search task, 
thereby allocating full attention to Gabor detection (visual search responses were not 
requested). Under diverted attention participants performed both tasks, prioritizing 
visual search. Expectation was manipulated by informing participants of the true 
probability of Gabor presence (as well as the attention condition) before each block 
began. This was either 25% (expect absence) or 75% (expect presence). After each 
experimental trial a condition-specific 3 down 1 up staircase titrated the contrast of 
the Gabor to maintain a consistent hit rate during the long experimental sessions. 
Expectation-specific staircases controlled for potentially greater levels of sensory 
adaptation to the Gabor in the 75% condition. 
Each block consisted of 12 trials from one of the conditions and blocks were 
completed in sets of 8 (2 of each condition, 96 trials). Blocks were fully 
counterbalanced.  Participants completed as many blocks as possible in each testing 
period (always equal numbers of each condition; 6 to 18 runs of each condition per 
session, M = 11.5). Across participants there was considerable variation in total trials 
completed due to the cumulative effect of reaction time differences.  
After explaining the task to participants they completed a set of practice trials. Next, 
they completed three staircase procedures (see Staircases) and finally, the 
experimental trials. Participants were encouraged to take regular breaks and were 
offered to leave the session early if they became too tired to continue. 
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Staircases 
Following a set of practice trials, participants completed 3 interleaved 2 down 1 up 
psychophysical adaptive staircase procedures with 8 reversals in order to equate 
task difficulty across conditions and participants. The visual display was always the 
same as that in the experimental trials but the instructions and response prompts 
differed. In the first staircase participants performed Gabor detection while ignoring 
the visual search array (full attention). Only Gabor present/absent responses were 
collected. Gabor contrast was titrated to achieve a 70% hit rate (contrast cannot be 
titrated in target absent trials) under full attention. In the second staircase the Gabor 
was ignored and participants performed only visual search. Here, only responses to 
the visual search target were collected (T present/absent). The SOA between the 
visual search array and the masking array was titrated to achieve 78% accuracy in 
the visual search task. In the third staircase participants performed both Gabor 
detection and visual search simultaneously, prioritising visual search and reported 
both Gabor presence/absence and T presence/absence. Here, Gabor contrast was 
titrated to achieve a 70% hit rate under diverted attention. The SOA for the visual 
search display was set to that determined by the second staircase. Confidence 
judgements were not collected during the staircases. 
EEG Acquisition 
 EEG data were collected on an ANT system at a sample rate of 2048 Hz with no 
online filtering. Activity was measured continuously from 62 active electrode 
channels arranged according to the 10/20 system over the scalp. The ground 
electrode was placed on the forehead and data were averaged across the whole 
head online. Impedances were kept below 7 kΩ throughout the experimental 
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session. Participants sat in an electrically shielded faraday cage with an external 
monitor viewed through shielding glass. Their head was stabilized with a chin rest. 
EEG pre-processing 
EEG data were pre-processed using the EEGLAB toolbox for Matlab. During pre-
processing EEG recordings were down-sampled to 256 Hz and high-pass (0.1Hz) 
filtered with a finite impulse response filter (EEGlab function ‘eegfilt’).  EEG data 
were visually inspected for excessively noisy channels, which were manually 
interpolated with their two neighbors on a block-wise basis. No participant required 
more than three channels interpolated (5 participants in total). No interpolated 
channels were included in analyses presented in this paper. After interpolation data 
were referenced to participants' average signal. Data were epoched from 1000ms 
before visual search array (and Gabor target, if present) onset to 500 ms after. 
Manual artifact rejection was performed on saccade, eye-blink and excessively noisy 
trials (5% of trials removed on average). For each participant, each electrode and 
each trial we computed the time-frequency wavelet decomposition of the EEG data. 
Window lengths of 1 oscillatory cycle at low frequencies (starting at 2Hz) were 
utilized. This length linearly increased with frequency band to a maximum of 15 
cycles at 50Hz. This decomposition method generated wavelet coefficients for 49 
log-spaced frequencies and 242 time points.  
Analysis 
   EEG: Electrode region of interest. We had an a priori hypothesis that top-down 
influences of prior expectation would be observable over occipital regions. Initial 
analyses were therefore restricted to the occipital electrodes O1, Oz and O2.  
Because phase at some time-frequency point will differ across electrodes, analyses 
were further restricted to one electrode per participant and session. To control for 
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differences in electrode placement, electrode ROIs (eROIs) were determined on a 
participant-by-participant and session-by-session basis according to their sensitivity 
to the Gabor detection task. The grand-averaged ERP indicated a negative 
deflection following hits relative to misses in the 75-200ms range. Each participant’s 
session-specific eROI was therefore chosen as the occipital electrode (i.e. O1, Oz or 
O2) that showed the greatest event-related potential (ERP) amplitude, as defined 
below. To compute the ERPs a 200ms pre-stimulus baseline was subtracted from 
each epoch. Epochs in which hits (respectively, misses) were made were averaged 
together. For each response type (hit or miss) we obtained the maximal local peak 
amplitude (LPA) in the 75ms-200ms period. LPA is defined as the greatest amplitude 
within a range of time points such that this peak is greater than the average 
amplitude of the surrounding 7 time points (Luck, 2005). This method minimises the 
chance of selecting spurious spikes. The eROI for each participant was chosen as 
the occipital electrode that showed the greatest value for LPAhit – LPAmiss. 
Subsequent analyses on phase were restricted to these eROIs. 
   EEG: Phase opposition analysis.  Next, we sought to determine if, for our eROI, 
spontaneous EEG phase differed at any time point and in any frequency band 
between 'reported present' (yes) and 'reported absent' (no) trials. This was done in 
order to isolate candidate time-frequency regions in which expectation might interact 
with the influence of EEG phase. The relationship between phase and response was 
quantified with the measure phase opposition (Vanrullen et al., 2011), which is 
defined as the mean of phase locking values (PLV) for yes and for no responses. 
Phase locking value measures the extent to which phase angle at some time-
frequency point over one electrode is predicted by either (A) phase at the same time-
frequency point over another electrode or (B) a behavioural response (as in the 
present paper). Here, we used PLV as a measure of the relationship between 
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ongoing phase and response. Because yes and no responses encompass all 
possible responses, and because stimulus onset is unpredictable (randomized ISIs), 
the joint PLV across all trials is expected to be small (no different from chance). 
However, if EEG phases for a given behavioural response are clustered about some 
angle (necessarily different for yes and no) then the individual PLVs for both yes and 
no responses, and therefore the resulting phase-opposition value, will be high (up to 
1 for perfect phase-opposition; see Vanrullen, Busch, Drewes, & Dubois, 2011 for 
additional details). High (and statistically significant) values indicate that phase 
predicts yes versus no responses. For a set of n trials where response R is given 
and where C(R) is the complex coefficients of the wavelet transform, PLVR and 
phase opposition PO for responses R1 and R2 are defined as follows: 
 
This measure PO is similar to the phase bifurcation index (PBI; Busch, Dubois, & 
VanRullen, 2009). PBI is defined as (PLVR1 -PLVALL) X (PLVR2 - PLVALL), that is, the 
baseline-corrected product of phase locking values for response 1 and for response 
2. We preferred the additive measure PO, because PBI can give unreliable results 
when taking the product over very small values. Moreover, because PO is additive it 
is robust to differences in trial counts between 'yes' and 'no' trials: any baseline 
correction applied to empirical PO values would be equally applied to bootstrapped 
PO values and cancel out. 
PO between yes and no responses was separately calculated for each level of 
attention and expectation. Separate calculation of PO for each level of expectation 
was necessary because we hypothesised that the phases predicting ‘yes’ 
(respectively, ‘no’) would differ as a function of expectation. The four PO time-
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frequency maps corresponding to each experimental condition were averaged 
together. 
At each time-frequency point, PO statistical significance was assessed by estimating 
the mean and standard deviation of the null distribution from 8000 bootstrapped 
samples per participant. To obtain bootstrapped samples, responses were pseudo-
randomly assigned to trials such that the number of yes and no responses stayed 
the same. PO was then recalculated. This method removed any relationship 
between the EEG signal and behaviour. Z-scores and p values were computed by 
comparing empirical PO values to the mean and standard deviation of the 
bootstrapped values. P values were false discovery rate (FDR) corrected for multiple 
comparisons over all frequencies and all pre-stimulus time-points.  
   EEG: Phase modulation of perceptual decision. The time-frequency 
representation of phase opposition values revealed that phase is related to the 
subjects’ response (see above and fig. 3B). However, we did not know (and aimed to 
determine) whether the “optimal” phase for a yes response is comparable for the 
different expectation conditions.  To determine whether the influence of expectation 
on decision is predicted by pre-stimulus phase in some frequency band, a follow-up 
analysis was run in which the data were restricted to a time-frequency region of 
interest. The time-frequency ROI was taken as the point of maximal phase 
opposition (PO) significance. Critically, there was no circularity in this analysis 
because PO values had been collapsed across levels of expectation.  
For each participant, each condition and each trial, the phase at the time-frequency 
ROI was binned into one of 6 phase bins. For each bin we then computed within-
subject signal detection theoretic (SDT) outcome variables d' (sensitivity), c (decision 
threshold/bias) confidence (percentage of trials reported with high confidence). This 
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provided values of each SDT outcome as a function of condition and phase bin. 
Using 6 bins enabled a sufficient number of trials for SDT estimates to be reliable.  
   Signal detection theoretic (SDT) outcomes. To obtain separate measures of 
detection sensitivity and decision bias, we used signal detection theory (SDT; Green 
& Swets, 1966; Sherman, Barrett, & Kanai, 2015). For each experimental condition, 
trials were categorized into hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections. Hit rate 
and false alarm rate are then defined as:  
  
From these quantities, detection sensitivity for the Gabor target, d’, and decision 
threshold c are given by: 
  
where Z is the inverse normal cumulative distribution function. Note that for decision 
threshold c, positive values represent a conservative bias (more likely to report no) 
and negative values represent a liberal bias (more likely to report yes).  
In computing these measures we used the log-linear rule, which adds 0.5 to the total 
number of hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections. This ensures SDT 
outcome variables can be computed for all conditions and phase bins, and also acts 
as a Bayesian prior on a d’ of zero. 
Confidence. Confidence ratings were collected on a four-point scale. To account for 
individual differences in how the scale was used (mean confidence: 2.92, range: 
2.34 - 3.47) we collapsed ratings onto a binary scale. This was achieved by 
calculating each participant's mean confidence across all conditions then 
categorising each rating as high (greater than the mean) or low (lower than the 
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mean). Note that we did not use a median split because here, the median is always 
an integer.  
 Statistical analyses. Data were collapsed over experimental session.  The factor 
Session (1 or 2) did not significantly interact with any other factors under any 
behavioral DV. Analyses were conducted using Matlab, CircStat toolbox for Matlab 
(Berens, 2009) for circular statistics, and SPSS. Where appropriate, p values were 
FDR (false discovery rate)-corrected. Where appropriate, circular statistics were 
corrected for the binning of phase angles. Unless otherwise specified, data subjected 
to within-subjects ANOVAs met the assumption of sphericity. 
Results 
Expectation and attention separately influence contrast sensitivity 
To determine the success of our attention manipulation we asked whether diverting 
attention with the visual search task decreased contrast sensitivity (as determined by 
the psychophysical staircases). Mean Gabor contrast was subjected to an Attention 
(full, diverted) x Expectation (25%, 75%) repeated-measures ANOVA. This revealed 
a significant main effect of Attention, F(1,17) = 22.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .57, such that 
contrast sensitivity was significantly greater (i.e. contrast threshold decreased) in the 
full (19.8%±1.2%) than diverted (25.7%±1.3%) attention condition. Our manipulation 
of attention was therefore successful. The ANOVA also revealed a significant main 
effect of Expectation, F(1,17) = 8.50, p= .010, ηp2 = .33, whereby contrast sensitivity 
significantly greater in the 75% (22.3%±1.1%) than the 25% (23.3%±1.1%) condition. 
This is likely to be an outcome of more Gabor exposure in the 75% than the 25% 
condition, which was controlled by implementing running staircases during the 
experimental phase (see Staircases). The interaction between Attention and 
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Expectation was not significant F(1,17) = 1.26, p = .278, ηp2 = .07. Results are 
represented in fig. 2A. 
Expectations bias decision and increase subjective confidence 
The main behavioral analyses presented here used Signal Detection theory (for 
details, see Methods). To ensure that our expectation manipulation successfully 
biased choice, decision threshold c was calculated as a function of condition. Here, c 
> 0 represents a conservative bias (i.e. towards reporting ‘no’) whereas c < 0 
represents a liberal bias (i.e. towards reporting ‘yes’). An Attention (full, diverted) x 
Expectation (25%, 75%) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that c was 
significantly affected by Expectation, F(1,17) = 70.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .80. As 
predicted, c was significantly more conservative in the 25% than the 75% condition 
(Mdiff = 0.21±0.03, figure 2B), meaning that decisions were more biased towards 
absence in the ‘expect absent’ (25%) than the ‘expect present’ (75%) condition. 
There was neither a significant main effect of Attention, F(1,17) = 0.01, p = .952, ηp2 
< .01 nor a significant interaction between factors, F(1,17) = 1.45 p = .244, ηp2 = .08. 
To determine whether detection sensitivity had been successfully equated across 
conditions an Attention x Expectation repeated-measures ANOVA under detection 
sensitivity d’ was run. This revealed a significant main effect of Expectation, F(1,17)  
= 52.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .76, such that d’ was greater in the 25% (2.60±0.09) than the 
75% (2.23±0.09) condition. This small difference was an unavoidable consequence 
of liberalizing decision threshold while ensuring a constant hit rate. The main effect 
of Attention, F(1,17) = 0.46, p = .507, ηp2 = .03, and its interaction with Expectation, 
F(1,17)= 0.23, p = .655, ηp2 = .01, was not significant.  
We have previously found that expectations increase subjective confidence 
(Sherman et al. 2015), and on this basis we hypothesized that  pre-stimulus phase 
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would modulate the influence of expectations on confidence. To address this at the 
behavioral level, the next analysis determined whether this finding was replicated.  
Previous work has shown that confidence increases when the perceptual report (i.e. 
percept) is congruent relative to incongruent with prior expectations. In the 25% 
condition, where Gabor absence is expected, the expectation-congruent report is 
'no', whereas in the 75% condition, where Gabor presence is expected, the 
expectation-congruent report is 'yes'. The reverse defines expectation-incongruent 
reports.  
This hypothesis was tested with a within-subjects Attention (full, diverted) x Accuracy 
(correct, incorrect) x Congruence (expectation-congruent, incongruent) repeated-
measures ANOVA under confidence. Results showed that confidence was higher 
under full than diverted attention, F(1,17) = 17.67, p = .001,  ηp2 = .51, for correct 
than incorrect responses, F(1,17) = 42.22, p < .001,  ηp2 = .71, and for congruent 
than incongruent decisions, F(1,17) = 19.07, p < .001,  ηp2 = .53.  
As shown in figure 3C, a significant attention x congruence interaction, F(1,17) = 
14,83, p = .001,  ηp2 = .47, revealed that diverting attention reduced the effect of 
congruence on confidence (Mdiff = 4.6% SEdiff = 1.4%) relative to full attention (Mdiff = 
14.1% SEdiff = 3.2%). Congruence still increased confidence in both attention 
conditions (diverted: t(17) = 3.25, bootstrapped p = .006; full: t(17) = 4.41, 
bootstrapped p = .001).  
As shown in figure 3D, a significant accuracy x congruence interaction, F(1,17) = 
8.48, p = .010,  ηp2 = .33, revealed that the influence of congruence on confidence 
was greater for incorrect (Mdiff = 12.0% SEdiff = 2.6%) than correct (Mdiff = 6.7% SEdiff 
= 2.1%) responses. Crucially, congruence increased confidence in both cases 
(incorrect: t(17) = 4.67, bootstrapped p = .001; correct: t(17) = 3.29, bootstrapped p = 
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.014) indicating that the influence of congruence on confidence is not confounded by 
differences in decisional accuracy. 
No other significant effects were found (attention x accuracy, p = .102, ηp2 = .15; 
attention x accuracy x congruence, p = .975, ηp2 < .01). Thus, effects under 
confidence reported in Sherman et al. (2015) were replicated: expectations liberalize 
confidence, and the effect was weaker (but present) under diverted than full 
attention. 
In summary, our paradigm successfully manipulated attention and expectation: 
contrast sensitivity increased in the presence of full attention, and expectation biased 
perceptual decisions. There was a small difference in d’ across levels of expectation 
but not across levels of attention. Expectation further increased confidence, such 
that participants were more confident in their Gabor detection reports when that 
report had been congruent with their prior expectations.  
While these effects of expectation were present at the behavioral level, they are not 
necessarily modulated by pre-stimulus brain oscillations. The next analyses first 
determined whether oscillatory phase predicts perceptual decision irrespective of 
expectation, and then determined whether the predictive value of oscillatory phase 
reflects prior expectations. 
Perceptual decision is predicted by occipital alpha phase 
Before addressing the question of whether the effect of expectation on decision is 
modulated by pre-stimulus phase over visual regions, we checked that pre-stimulus 
phase predicted perceptual choice, irrespective of expectation.  Analyses were 
restricted to the occipital electrode (O1, Oz or O2) that showed the greatest post-
stimulus response to the Gabor task. This method gave, for each participant and for 
each of the 2 sessions, a single electrode (eROI) that was involved in early post-
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stimulus processing. eROIs were extracted by selecting the occipital electrode with 
the greatest event-related potential (ERP) amplitude for hit relative to miss trials (Mdiff 
= 0.75µv, SDdiff = 0.64µv, see Methods for details).  
The predictive value of phase in perceptual decision was assessed using the 
measure phase opposition (PO). PO is the average of phase-locking values (PLV) 
for two responses – here, yes and no (Vanrullen et al., 2011) - and therefore reflects 
the extent to which pre-stimulus phase predicts subsequent choice (see Methods for 
details). For response R and complex wavelet coefficients C, PLV and PO are 
defined as: 
         
PO values for each time-frequency point were calculated separately for each level of 
attention and expectation and subsequently collapsed across expectation conditions. 
This was done because for this initial analysis we were seeking time-frequency 
regions in which EEG phase predicted decision, but not explicitly seeking time-
frequency regions in which the influence of phase depended on expectation. 
Averaging over conditions means phase effects are still detectable if expectation 
changes (or even reverses) the preferred phase for yes or no responses. 
Interactions between phase and expectation were run in a separate follow-up 
analysis, thereby avoiding ‘double-dipping’.  
To obtain p-values, PO values were compared to the null distribution by pseudo-
randomly allocating a behavioral response to each phase angle at each time-
frequency point. This process was repeated for each session and each condition 
2000 times (8000 in total), giving 1.8 x 1070 bootstrapped samples over all 
participants. The p-values were FDR-corrected over the entire pre-stimulus region (-
1000ms to stimulus onset) and over all frequencies. 
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This analysis revealed a region of significant phase opposition in the pre-stimulus 
alpha range over all trials, which reached maximum significance at 10Hz, 119ms 
prior to stimulus onset, (p = 10-7, αFDR = 10-2.6, figure 3A,left). This means that pre-
stimulus occipital alpha phase predicts yes versus no responses. Given that phase-
modulation of perceptual hit rate has been shown to be dependent on attention 
(Busch & VanRullen, 2010), we then split phase opposition values into two separate 
maps, one for each level of attention. Significant phase opposition was present 
under full attention (p-119ms,10Hz = 10-4, αFDR = 10-2, figure 3A, center), and was indeed 
reduced in extent (but present) under diverted attention (p-119ms,10Hz = 10-5, αFDR = 10-
3, figure 3A, right), consistent with previous work.  
This result shows that pre-stimulus occipital alpha phase predicted decision, but we 
do not yet know whether decision bias or detection sensitivity was fluctuating. This 
question was addressed in the next section.  
Pre-stimulus occipital alpha phase predicts decision thresholds 
Previous studies on pre-stimulus phase have not been able to separate sensitivity 
from decision bias because phase analyses have only time-locked to target-present 
trials. Whereas target-absent trials usually have no obvious reference point for the 
phase analysis (when using a randomized inter-trial interval), here the onset of the 
search array served as a reference point for both Gabor-present and Gabor-absent 
phase determination. This allowed us to calculate the theoretically independent 
measures c (decision threshold) and d’ (detection sensitivity).  
Computing these values required binning phase angles from each trial. We needed 
data from just one time point, because pooling phase angles over time points results 
in associating multiple, systematically rotating phase angles with a single behavioral 
response. Similarly, phase angles from differing frequency bands cannot be 
20	
	
compared in terms of their position in an oscillation. We extracted phase angles from 
each epoch from the eROIs at the -119ms, 10Hz time-frequency point: the point of 
maximal PO significance. Each phase angle was then binned into one of 6 phase 
bins.  
By considering responses on those trials this gave, for each participant, an 
associated set of hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections as a function of 
phase bin. Trials were further categorized according to experimental condition. In 
turn, for each participant we could calculate d' and c as a function of phase bin, 
attention and expectation. Note that in splitting trials according to phase bin, the 
resulting six values of c per condition will not average exactly to the single value of c 
per condition when computed irrespective of phase bin. 
First, we asked whether pre-stimulus phase predicts decision threshold by running 
an Attention (full, diverted) x Expectation (25%, 75%) x Phase bin (1 to 6) repeated-
measures ANOVA on decision threshold c. Only interactions with phase bin are 
reported. This analysis revealed no significant main effect of Phase, F(5,85) = 0.66, 
p = .670, ηp2 = .04, no significant Attention by Phase bin interaction, F(5,85) = 0.38, p 
= .862, ηp2 = .02, and no significant three-way interaction, F(5,85) = 0.66, p = .650, 
ηp2 = .04. Critically, there was a significant two-way interaction between Expectation 
and Phase bin, F(5,85) = 2.64, p = .029, ηp2 = .13.  
This interaction is depicted in figure 3, and is such that, as hypothesized, (1) c 
appears to oscillate with phase in both expectation conditions and (2) the two phase-
criterion functions appear to be in anti-phase. These curves being in anti-phase 
mean that the range of phase values related to highest c in the 25% condition 
(conservative, expectation-congruent) are similar to the minimum values for c in the 
75% condition (liberal, expectation-congruent). This range is consistent with what we 
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would expect from the optimal phase for perceptual priors to influence perceptual 
decision., At π rad away from this range, phase predicted the most liberal responses 
in the 25% condition (incongruent) and the most conservative responses in the 75% 
condition (incongruent). This suggests that in this range of phase the top-down priors 
exert their weakest influence, and that the relative effect of perceptual priors is 
minimal. We assume that here, the influence of bottom-up signals is therefore 
maximal. 
Supporting part of our first hypothesis, this indicates that independently of attention, 
the extent to which pre-stimulus occipital alpha phase predicted decision threshold 
differed in the 25% (expect absent) and 75% (expect present) conditions.  
Figure 3 suggests that c oscillates in both conditions (both functions are sinusoids), 
but that the same phases predict opposing responses (the functions are in anti-
phase). However, we have not yet determined this statistically. This was the aim of 
our next two analyses.  
Prior expectations change the response predicted by pre-stimulus alpha 
phase. 
Does phase predict c in both expectation conditions? To check whether the phase-
criterion function were sinusoids we tested whether the distance between the peak 
and trough of each function was π rad. We used a circular v-test, which tests the 
hypothesis that a set of angles (here, the peak-to-trough distance) is significantly 
clustered about some specified angle (here, π rad). This analysis revealed that 
indeed, the peak-to-trough distance was approximately π rad in both the 25% (v = 
43.98, p < .001) and the 75% (v = 12.56, p = .044) conditions. This means that both 
functions are sinusoids, and therefore that phase predicts criterion in both the 25% 
and 75% conditions.  
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Next we asked whether the two phase-criterion functions were in anti-phase. This 
was the final, key step in testing whether expectations were reflected in pre-stimulus 
phase. A circular v-test, testing whether the peak-to-peak difference between the two 
phase-criterion functions was significantly clustered about π rad, revealed this to be 
the case, v = 43.98, p < .001. Thus, the two functions are in anti-phase, and the 
same phases that predict ‘yes’ when expecting target presence predict ‘no’ when 
expecting target absence. These phases are therefore those at which expectations 
exert their greatest effect on decision.  
In summary, we have supported our first hypothesis: that the influence of 
expectations on decision is oscillating with pre-stimulus alpha phase. We do not 
claim that a decision threshold is set at or before stimulus onset, because clearly, 
sensory evidence is not yet available to the visual system. Rather, our data show 
that prior to stimulus onset, ongoing alpha phase biases the position of a decision 
threshold that is set later in time. 
Rhythmic fluctuations in confidence  
 Our second hypothesis was that pre-stimulus alpha phase would also predict the 
influence of expectations on confidence. Behaviorally, confidence increases for 
expected percepts. Consistent with this, our behavioral analyses showed that 
confidence for expectation-congruent reports (i.e. reporting 'yes' in the 75% condition 
or reporting 'no' in the 25% condition) was higher than for incongruent reports (i.e. 
reporting 'no' in the 75% condition or reporting 'yes' in the 75% condition). Therefore, 
if phase predicts the influence of expectations on confidence then there should be a 
range of phase angles which predict high confidence when congruent reports were 
made, but low confidence when incongruent reports were made. This set of phases 
would be the optimal phases for expectations to shape confidence.  
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The four-point scale was collapsed into a binary confident/guess report by 
performing a mean split on individual participants' reports. Next, we computed 
participants’ percentage of decisions reported with high confidence, as a function of 
phase bin, attention, and expectation-response congruence.  
An Attention x Congruence x Phase bin repeated-measures ANOVA under 
confidence revealed a significant main effect of phase bin (p < .001), but the phase-
confidence function was not sinusoidal and therefore does not reflect the existence 
of an optimal phase for high confidence. The three-way interaction was also non-
significant (p = .198, ηp2 = .08).  Crucially, the analysis did reveal a significant 2-way 
Congruence x Phase bin interaction, F(5,85) = 4.10, p = .002, ηp2 =.19.  
To break down this interaction we tested whether confidence oscillated with phase at 
either level of congruence. As in the analysis under decision threshold, circular v-
tests tested the peak-to-trough difference of the two phase-confidence functions 
against π. These revealed that subjective confidence oscillated with pre-stimulus 
alpha phase for both expectation-incongruent, v = 34.56, p < .0001 and expectation-
congruent, v = 25.13, p < .001, responses (figure 3C)..  
As was the case for the decision threshold analysis, visual inspection of the figure 
suggests that the two functions are in anti-phase: phases associated with relatively 
high confidence for congruent reports are associated with relatively low confidence 
for incongruent reports. This was confirmed statistically with a circular v-test that 
showed the peak-to-peak distance between the two phase-confidence functions to 
be significantly clustered about π rad, v = 43.98, p < .0001. In turn, this analysis 
indicates that the two functions are in anti-phase.  
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Interestingly, the phase at which congruent yes/no responses are most likely 
appears similar to that at which congruence maximally predicts confidence (see 
figure 3C and B, respectively): the peak of the phase-expectation function (the 25% 
minus the 75% sinusoid) appears associated with high confidence for congruent 
reports, but low confidence for guess reports.  
In summary, our results suggest that at phases where prior expectations exerted 
stronger influences on decision, confidence was high for the expectation congruent 
report, but low for expectation-incongruent reports. This means that when the 
influence of priors was strong, confidence increased for predicted perceptual events, 
but decreased when expectations were violated. Together with the results under 
decision threshold, these data suggest a 10Hz alternation in the extent to which 
perceptual priors bias both objective and subjective decision-making.  
Alpha phase does not predict perceptual sensitivity 
Confidence is typically correlated with accuracy, such that participants are more 
confident when they are correct than when they are incorrect. Previous work has 
implicated pre-stimulus alpha phase in the detection of perceptual stimuli (Dugué, 
Marque, & VanRullen, 2011; Mathewson et al., 2012; Rohenkohl & Nobre, 2011), 
however previous studies have not been able to time-lock the phase analysis to 
target-absent as well as target-present trials. In turn, it is unclear whether these 
results reflect alternations in decision biases or in perceptual sensitivity. If sensitivity 
is predicted by pre-stimulus alpha phase, our results under confidence may simply 
reflect fluctuations in d’.  
Our results under c implicate alpha phase in decisional biases, however to ascertain 
whether alpha phase is also implicated in sensitivity we ran an Attention x 
Expectation x Phase bin rmANOVA under d'. This revealed no significant main effect 
25	
	
of Phase bin, F(5,85) = 1.65, p = .156, ηp2 = .09, nor any significant interactions 
(Attention x Phase: F(5,85) = 0.86, p = .507, ηp2 = .05 (figure 3D); Expectation x 
Phase F(5,85) = 0.37, p = .868, ηp2 = .02;  Attention x Expectation x Phase,  F(5,85) 
= 0.88, p = .499, ηp2 = .05).  
An analogous Bayesian repeated-measures Attention x Expectation x Phase bin 
ANOVA was run on JASP using a Cauchy prior of 0.8 HWHM. This revealed 
evidence for the null hypothesis of no main predictive effect of phase (BF = 0.025), 
as well as no predictive effect of phase that depended on attention (BF = 0.003), 
expectation (BF = 0.001) or both attention and expectation (BF < .0001).   
Previous studies have found that it was useful to realign each participant’s phase-hit 
rate function in order to correct for individual differences in optimal phases for 
perceptual sensitivity (Busch & VanRullen, 2010). Even using this method, however, 
we found no evidence for phase predicting d’ under either full (p = .787) or diverted 
(p = .407) attention. 
Together, these data robustly show that pre-stimulus alpha phase does not predict 
detection sensitivity. Rather, the data support the interpretation that alpha phase 
reflects fluctuations in objective and subjective decisional biases. 
 
Discussion 
The present experiment implemented a paradigm that both separated the influences 
of expectation from those of attention, and allowed pre-stimulus oscillations to be 
time-locked to both target-absent and -present trials. Critically, this design enabled 
us to compute signal detection theoretic measures as a function of phase and 
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condition, and in turn separate phase-modulation of detection sensitivity from phase-
modulation of decision threshold.  
Our results show that top-down expectations rhythmically bias perceptual decision-
making in the pre-stimulus period, such that the extent to which expectations biased 
decision was predicted by the phase of pre-stimulus occipital alpha oscillations. The 
data revealed that decision threshold was predicted by phase both when expecting 
target presence and when expecting target absence. However, expectation flipped 
the relationship between phase and criterion (decision threshold), that is, the phase-
criterion functions were in anti-phase: the same phases that predicted biases 
towards reporting ‘yes’ when expecting target absence predicted biases towards 
reporting ‘no’ when expecting target presence. These phases correspond to the 
optimal phases for expectations to influence perception.  
Importantly, we do not claim that perceptual priors entrained alpha oscillations, as is 
the case for temporal predictions  (e.g. Rohenkohl and Nobre 2011; Samaha et al. 
2015). Rather, priors determined whether a specific phase angle facilitated a ‘yes’ or 
a ‘no’ judgment. This effect of pre-stimulus alpha phase is interpreted as evidence 
for fluctuations in state of the visual system prior to stimulus onset affecting the 
propensity to use prior evidence post-stimulus, at the decision stage. Speculatively, 
this could occur if prior evidence for or against target presence is periodically 
transmitted to visual areas, in turn resulting in periodic changes in the baseline from 
which evidence accumulation begins (Summerfield & Egner, 2009).  
Fluctuations in the influence of expectation on objective decisions was accompanied 
by fluctuations in subjective confidence. For incongruent reports, subjective 
violations of expectation were associated with degrees of confidence that tracked the 
influence of the prior expectation: when perceptual priors exerted greater effects on 
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decision, subjective violations of expectation were associated with greater subjective 
uncertainty. Moreover, the phase-confidences function for congruent and 
incongruent responses were in anti-phase: the phase that predicted greatest 
uncertainty for incongruent reports also predicted highest confidence for congruent 
reports. Together, these results extend previous work demonstrating that confidence 
evolves with the decision variable at early processing stages (Fetsch, Kiani, 
Newsome, & Shadlen, 2014;  Kiani & Shadlen, 2009) by showing that decision and 
confidence are jointly shaped by top-down influences.  As is the case for yes/no 
decisions, we interpret these results as evidence for biases in the early processing of 
sensory signals (for example, changes in starting point of evidence accumulation) 
modulating reported subjective confidence at late stages of the decision-making 
stream.  
Consistent with previous work, we found that alpha phase-modulation of perception 
is greater with attention than without (Busch & VanRullen, 2010; Landau & Fries, 
2012), though here, still present under diverted attention. Critically, while previous 
evidence has demonstrated alpha-modulation of perceptual hit rate (Busch et al., 
2009; Dugué et al., 2011; Landau & Fries, 2012; Mathewson et al., 2009), it has not 
been possible to ascertain whether changes in hit rate have been driven by changes 
in sensitivity or bias. Here we implicate alpha oscillations in biasing perceptual 
decisions, but not increasing sensitivity. Critically, the influence of alpha phase on 
decision is modulated by expectations. Our data also extend previous research that 
has revealed that the influence of expectation on decision is predicted by pre-
stimulus beta-band power over both motor (de Lange et al., 2013) and 
somatosensory (van Ede, Jensen, & Maris, 2010) cortices, as well as by BOLD 
responses in a range of cortical areas (Hesselmann, Kell, & Kleinschmidt, 2008; 
Hesselmann, Sadaghiani, Friston, & Kleinschmidt, 2010; Rahnev, Bahdo, de Lange, 
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& Lau, 2012; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008). Pre-stimulus signals biasing decision 
at early stages of visual processing (i.e. in sensory cortices) has not, to our 
knowledge, been shown before. Our results therefore support an early, and critically, 
rhythmic, influence of expectations on decision.  
Top-down influences are increasingly modeled within Bayesian perspectives 
frameworks (Clark, 2013; Daunizeau et al., 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Kersten, 
Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006; Mathys et al., 2014). 
Here, perception is described as a Bayesian inference on sensory causes. A core 
tenet of these frameworks is that the prior probability of sensory causes will constrain 
inference accordingly, and so probable or ‘expected’ sensory causes are more likely 
to be chosen and thus perceived (Angeles, Yuille, & Kersten, 2011; Knill & Pouget, 
2004; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Spratling, 2008). A plausible implication of this view is 
that such prior probabilities should be reflected in the state of the brain in the pre-
stimulus period. Consistent with this, we have shown that the influence of priors on 
decision oscillates with pre-stimulus alpha phase.  
One possible explanation for these findings is that alpha oscillations orchestrate the 
communication of prior expectations to visual cortex. On this view, rhythmic 
influences of expectation on decision threshold would reflect fluctuations in the prior 
probability of the reported perceptual decision. However, an alternative view is that 
our results reflect fluctuations in the weighting of priors on decision, rather than the 
prior probability itself. On this alternative view, alpha phase reflects the attentional 
state of the system, consistent with previous theoretical work (Jensen, Bonnefond, & 
VanRullen, 2012; Palva & Palva, 2007) , so that priors are assigned a greater weight 
on perceptual decision when sensory signals are expected to be unreliable. Here, 
perceptual expectations would increase or decrease the excitability of relevant 
neural populations, or gain, according to whether a target is expected to appear or 
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not. In both cases, pre-stimulus occipital alpha phase modulates the relative 
weighting of prior expectations and sensory data, however our data cannot 
discriminate between these two views, and we leave this question open to future 
research.  
In summary, we have described evidence indicating a periodic influence of 
perceptual priors on both objective (detection) and subjective (confidence) decisions, 
predicted by the phase of pre-stimulus occipital alpha oscillations. This rapid and 
periodic alternation between top-down and bottom-up influences in visual areas 
extends existing data implicating alpha oscillations in top-down processing (von 
Stein, Chiang, & König, 2000). Together, our data suggest that alpha oscillations 
may periodically transmit perceptual priors, and in turn reveal a plausible neural 
mechanism by which prior information may subserve top-down modulation of early 
visual processing: alpha oscillations may orchestrate the reciprocal exchange of 
predictions and prediction errors.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Trial sequence. Before the first trial of a block participants are informed of 
the experimental condition they are in. In this example, ‘25%’ means that the 
participant is in the 25% of Gabor presence condition and ‘ignore letters’ means the 
participant should ignore the visual search array (i.e. they are in the full attention 
condition). During the trial a target Gabor is either present (top) or absent (bottom). 
Similarly, a visual search target ‘T’ is either present (bottom) or absent (top). 
Response prompts followed the offset of the masking array. 
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Figure 2. Behavioural results. 
A. Mean contrast at which the Gabor was presented over the course of the 
experiment in each condition. Asterisks over levels of expectation represent 
significantly higher thresholds in the 75% than the 25% condition (main effect). 
Asterisks over levels of attention represent significantly higher thresholds under full 
than diverted attention (main effect). 
B. Effects of attention and expectation on decision threshold c. Independently of 
attention, decision threshold in the 25% condition, where Gabor absence is expected 
is higher than in the 75% condition where Gabor presence is expected. Note that 
greater values represent stronger biases for reporting target absence. 
C. Effects of attention and expectation-report congruence on confidence. Congruent 
responses are reports of presence/absence in the 75%/25% condition, and vice 
versa for incongruent responses. Confidence is higher for congruent than 
incongruent reports in both attention conditions, but the effect of congruence is 
greater under full attention. The main effects of both attention and congruence are 
also significant. Error bars represent within-subject SEM. *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p ≤ 
.001.  
D. Effects of accuracy and expectation-report congruence on confidence. Congruent 
responses are reports of presence/absence in the 75%/25% condition, and vice 
versa for incongruent responses. Confidence is higher for congruent than 
incongruent reports for both correct and incorrect responses, but the effect of 
congruence is greater in the incorrect case. The main effects of both accuracy and 
congruence are also significant. Error bars represent within-subject SEM. *p < .05, ** 
p < .01, *** p ≤ .001. 
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Figure 3. EEG results. 
 
A. Time-frequency representation of phase opposition between yes and no reports 
over the eROI for (top) all trials, (middle) full attention, and (bottom) diverted 
attention. The vertical dashed line represents stimulus onset. The color scale 
represents log-transformed p-values. Regions that survive FDR correction are 
outlined in white.  
B. Relationship between decision threshold c and binned occipital 10Hz phase at -
119ms. The blue phase-criterion function represents results from the 25% (expect 
absent) condition and the red phase-criterion function represents results from the 
75% (expect present) condition. Grey shading indicates the phase values which 
maximally predict the influence of expectation on decision: decisions are maximally 
biased towards reporting ‘no’ in the expect 25% condition, but towards ‘yes’ in the 
75% condition. Colored outlines represent within-subjects SEM. 
C. Relationship between confidence and pre-stimulus 10Hz phase at -119ms. 
Congruent responses are reports of presence/absence in the 75%/25% conditions 
and vice versa for incongruent responses. Confidence significantly fluctuates with 
phase for both congruent (green) and incongruent (red) reports. Shaded regions 
represent within-subjects SEM. 
D. Relationship between detection sensitivity d\' and pre-stimulus 10Hz phase at -
119ms for the full (left) and diverted attention (right) conditions. Sensitivity does not 
fluctuate with phase in either condition. Shaded regions represent within-subjects 
SEM. 
